The politicians who exist today weren't around when previous civilizations declined and/or collapsed. Many politicians demonstrate little evidence that they know how to effectively manage this one's decline/collapse (almost the opposite, that some are actually driving decline/collapse) as much as…
The politicians who exist today weren't around when previous civilizations declined and/or collapsed. Many politicians demonstrate little evidence that they know how to effectively manage this one's decline/collapse (almost the opposite, that some are actually driving decline/collapse) as much as they might like us to think they do, or as much as some of us would like to think they do. Some are driving essentially blind and taking their captive populations-- hostages-- along for the ride.
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"In summary, despite the common impression that societal collapse is rare, or even largely fictional, 'the picture that emerges is of a process recurrent in history, and global in its distribution' (Tainter, 1988). See also Yoffee and Cowgill (1988), Goldstein (1988), Ibn Khaldun (1958), Kondratieff (1984), and Parsons (1991). As Turchin and Nefedov (2009) contend, there is a great deal of support for 'the hypothesis that secular cycles — demographic–social–political oscillations of a very long period (centuries long) are the rule, rather than an exception in the large agrarian states and empires.'
This brings up the question of whether modern civilization is similarly susceptible. It may seem reasonable to believe that modern civilization, armed with its greater technological capacity, scientific knowledge, and energy resources, will be able to survive and endure whatever crises historical societies succumbed to. But the brief overview of collapses demonstrates not only the ubiquity of the phenomenon, but also the extent to which advanced, complex, and powerful societies are susceptible to collapse...
In this paper... we propose a simple model, not intended to describe actual individual cases, but rather to provide a general framework that allows carrying out 'thought experiments' for the phenomenon of collapse and to test changes that would avoid it. This model (called HANDY, for Human and Nature DYnamics) advances beyond existing biological dynamic population models by simultaneously modeling two separate important features which seem to appear across so many societies that have collapsed: (1) the stretching of resources due to the strain placed on the ecological carrying capacity (Abel, 1980, Catton, 1980, Kammen, 1994, Ladurie, 1987, Ponting, 1991, Postan, 1966, Redman, 1999, Redman et al., 2004, Wood, 1998, Wright, 2004), and (2) the economic stratification of society into Elites and Masses (or 'Commoners')"
~ Safa Motesharrei, Jorge Rivas, Eugenia Kalnay: 'Human and nature dynamics (HANDY): Modeling inequality and use of resources in the collapse or sustainability of societies', [ sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800914000615 ]
~ The Near-Tautology of The Failed State ~
The politicians who exist today weren't around when previous civilizations declined and/or collapsed. Many politicians demonstrate little evidence that they know how to effectively manage this one's decline/collapse (almost the opposite, that some are actually driving decline/collapse) as much as they might like us to think they do, or as much as some of us would like to think they do. Some are driving essentially blind and taking their captive populations-- hostages-- along for the ride.
---
"In summary, despite the common impression that societal collapse is rare, or even largely fictional, 'the picture that emerges is of a process recurrent in history, and global in its distribution' (Tainter, 1988). See also Yoffee and Cowgill (1988), Goldstein (1988), Ibn Khaldun (1958), Kondratieff (1984), and Parsons (1991). As Turchin and Nefedov (2009) contend, there is a great deal of support for 'the hypothesis that secular cycles — demographic–social–political oscillations of a very long period (centuries long) are the rule, rather than an exception in the large agrarian states and empires.'
This brings up the question of whether modern civilization is similarly susceptible. It may seem reasonable to believe that modern civilization, armed with its greater technological capacity, scientific knowledge, and energy resources, will be able to survive and endure whatever crises historical societies succumbed to. But the brief overview of collapses demonstrates not only the ubiquity of the phenomenon, but also the extent to which advanced, complex, and powerful societies are susceptible to collapse...
In this paper... we propose a simple model, not intended to describe actual individual cases, but rather to provide a general framework that allows carrying out 'thought experiments' for the phenomenon of collapse and to test changes that would avoid it. This model (called HANDY, for Human and Nature DYnamics) advances beyond existing biological dynamic population models by simultaneously modeling two separate important features which seem to appear across so many societies that have collapsed: (1) the stretching of resources due to the strain placed on the ecological carrying capacity (Abel, 1980, Catton, 1980, Kammen, 1994, Ladurie, 1987, Ponting, 1991, Postan, 1966, Redman, 1999, Redman et al., 2004, Wood, 1998, Wright, 2004), and (2) the economic stratification of society into Elites and Masses (or 'Commoners')"
~ Safa Motesharrei, Jorge Rivas, Eugenia Kalnay: 'Human and nature dynamics (HANDY): Modeling inequality and use of resources in the collapse or sustainability of societies', [ sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800914000615 ]